Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, trade embargoes and blockades have traditionally been used to entice nations to alter their behavior or to punish them for certain behavior. The intentions behind these policies are generally noble, at least on the surface.
Introduction
There is a widespread belief that we should not trade with our enemies, either for moral reasons or reasons of national defense. But once one looks beneath the surface of this policy, deep cracks appear. From a strictly utilitarian view, it might be in a nation's best interest to trade with enemies, either because doing so will have more good effects than bad in the economic sense, or because trading with an enemy might be in the national interest. Even if the trade sanction does not lead to a shooting war, other adverse consequences often result. The nation instigating the sanction is often harmed more than the targeted enemy country. One of President Jimmy Carter's less brilliant moves was to cut off the supply of wheat to the Soviet Union (Hufbauer et al. 1990a: 163-174) . U.S. wheat farmers were prohibited from selling to the Soviets, so they sold it to Canada and the Canadians sold it to the Soviets, thus depriving U.S. farmers of a profit opportunity with no corresponding gain to offset their losses. The only predictable outcome of such restraints is that the individuals who are prohibited from making the sale will lose the sale to someone else (Ravenal) .
Economic sanctions generally do not work (Doxey; Knorr; Willett and Jalalighajar; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1990a, b) . At most, they will raise the price of the restricted good in the country intended to be punished. The countries that participate in the sanctions will lose sales without being able to show any corresponding benefit.
In fact, sanctions often increase animosity between countries that are already not on friendly terms (McGee 1994a: 24) . There is ample evidence to show that liberalizing trade leads to political liberalization. Both South Korea and Taiwan moved from authoritarian and semiclosed regimes to free democratic regimes because free trade was permitted to break down barriers (Dorn: 1). It is likely that the same would happen eventually in China and North Korea if given the chance.
China, North Korea and MFN

The Cuban Blockade
The Cuban blockade has not worked (Hufbauer et al. 1990b: 194-204) .
Castro has been able to maintain his grip on power while numerous U.S.
Presidents have been elected, assassinated, unelected and retired. One commentator has stated that the Cuban case serves as "a monument to the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool." Sanctions generally do not work, and even when they are not a total failure, they have adverse consequences. They rarely can be justified even on utilitarian grounds, since embargoes are a negative-sum game. There are more losers than winners.
A suggestion has been made in an attempt to get around the negative-sum game and shoot yourself in the foot aspects of most sanctions. Anderson (1997; suggests that Congress should:
• Require an analysis that measures the economic cost to the U.S. economy of all current and proposed economic sanctions;
• Provide compensation to U.S. companies whose investments are lost or devalued because of a U.S. -imposed sanction;
• Establish a time limit on any new economic sanction;
• Require an explicit national security justification for any new economic sanction; and
• Grant China a multi-year waiver for most-favored-nation trading status.
While adoption of these suggestions would alleviate part of the problem in some cases, at its base Anderson's suggestion is faulty because he begins from the wrong premise. Basically, he advocates undertaking only those sanctions that result in a positive-sum game, which is at least better than the situation we have now. He also advocates compensating those companies that would lose under a particular sanction, which is a great improvement over present policy. And he would include a sunset provision to make sure the sanction eventually is automatically lifted. (Anderson 1998:1) . But his suggested improvements are flawed because they are utilitarian-based.
Most economists subscribe to the utilitarian philosophy in spite of its two fatal flaws --the inability to measure gains and losses (Rothbard 1970: 260-268) and the total disregard for individual rights (McGee 1994b) . A better approach is to ask whether anyone's property, contract or association rights have been violated. If the answer is yes, then the policy is a bad one and should not be implemented. If the answer is no, then the activity should not be prohibited, even if it may be immoral. It is not the government's job to make people moral, but only to prevent them from violating each others' rights.
The basis of this rights approach lies in the nonaggression axiom, which states that the initiation of force is never justified. Thus, if a policy involves the initiation of force, it is inferior to a policy where there is no initiation of force. What would happen to the evil dictators of the world if there were no embargoes, sanctions or blockades? In a sense, this question is itself illegitimate because it is based in the utilitarian philosophy of winners and losers. Once the question is asked, one begins to think of the winners and losers from such a policy and attempts to weigh them to see whether the result is a positive-sum game, when in fact the main issue --are someone's rights violated --is totally ignored.
The only way to prevent individual rights from being violated is to lift all sanctions, embargoes and blockades and allow individual buyers and sellers to make their own decisions regarding with whom they want to trade. If some individuals refuse to buy products that may be made with child labor, they should be able to make that choice for themselves. If others do not mind buying such products, let them do it. At least they will be helping some poor family to raise its total family income, even if the concept of child labor is repugnant to those of us who are fortunate enough to live in a different world. The correct approach to trade policy is not to be found in any utilitarian analysis. It must be based in rights theory.
